Stagflation

Yes, the below analysis has also been the Fed’s position, up until this week’s speeches.

It’s been about a crude/food/$ negative supply shock, supported by Saudis/Russians acting as swing producer and biofuels linking crude prices to food prices.

The fed has called the price hikes relative value stories that they don’t want turning into an inflation story. They feel they have room to cut rates as long as expectations stay well anchored, which includes wage demands but other things as well.

Yellen the dove, along with the hawks, now saying inflation expectations are showing signs of elevating, and saying energy costs are being passed through to core inflation is a departure from previous Fed rhetoric and may signal they are at or near their limits regarding ff cuts (data dependent, of course).

Also, Bernanke pushing Congress and the President to add to the deficit could also be a sign he is reaching his inflation tolerance regarding lowering the FF rate. The mainstream belief is that inflation is a function of monetary policy, not fiscal policy.

Now with the ECB perhaps throwing in the towel on inflation as well, look at how the commodities are responding. ‘Cost push inflation’ is ripping, and the perception is the CB’s around the world will act to sustain demand, including pushing for larger fiscal deficits.

Difficult to explain why so many have stagflation on the brain It is difficult to explain why so many folks still have stagflation or inflation on the brain just because wheat prices have soared to new highs. We have to distinguish between relative and absolute pricing. Not only that, but unlike the 1970s, the current ‘inflation’ backdrop is much more narrowly confined. The key is the labor market. And here we have a 4-quarter growth rate in unit labor costs of a mere 1% in 4Q (a three-year low), which compares to 4% heading into the 2001 downturn. In other words, as far as the labor market is concerned, inflation is less of a threat to the economy than it was at this same stage of the cycle seven years ago. In fact, heading into the 1990 recession, the trend in ULC was also 4% – the Fed sliced the funds rate from almost 10% to 3% that cycle, for crying out loud. In fact, scouring more than 50 years’ worth of data, at no time in the past has the year-to-year trend in unit labor costs been as low as it is today heading into an official recession. Make no mistake, deflation is going to emerge as the next major macro theme.


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Yellen on inflation

SF Fed president Yellen on inflation, from yesterday’s speech in Hawaii:

Now let me turn to inflation. The recent news has been disappointing. Over the past three months, the personal consumption expenditures price index excluding food and energy, or the core PCE price index—one of the key measures included in the FOMC’s quarterly forecasts—has increased by 2.7 percent, bringing the increase over the past 12 months to 2.2 percent. This rate is somewhat above what I consider to be price stability.

Yellen is the most dovish Fed president and not currently a voting member. Notable that 2.2% core PCE is clearly above her comfort zone.

I expect core inflation to moderate over the next few years, edging down to around 1¾ percent under appropriate monetary policy.

Appropriate monetary policy is a requirement to bring inflation down.

Such an outcome is broadly consistent with my interpretation of the Fed’s price stability mandate. Moreover, I believe the risks on the upside and downside are roughly balanced. First, it appears that core inflation has been pushed up somewhat by the pass-through

Up until now, the Fed has taken comfort that ‘pass through’ was not happening. This is what brings core up to headline, something the Fed has previously believed was not happening.

of higher energy and food prices and by the drop in the dollar. However, recently, energy prices have turned down in response to concerns that a slowdown in the U.S. will weaken economic growth around the world, and thereby lower the demand for energy.

Meaning an upturn in energy prices will do the reverse. Seems inflation is now a function of energy prices. This is a change from energy prices weakening demand and causing deflation. Now, it is passing through and causing core inflation.

Another factor that could restrain inflationary pressures is the slowdown in the U.S. economy. This can be expected to create more slack in labor and goods markets, a development that typically has been associated with reduced inflation in the past.

Yes. This is the remaining dove position. Previous speeches this week by the hawks have expressed concerns that economic weakness and slack in the labor markets will not bring down core inflation.

This is the problem of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Seems that the applicable historical data now shows that it takes ever larger moves in unemployment to move the inflation needle in either direction.

A key factor for inflation going forward is inflation expectations. These appear to have become well-anchored over the past decade or so as the Fed’s inflation resolve has gained credibility. Very recently, far-dated inflation compensation—a measure derived from various Treasury yields—has risen, but it’s not clear whether this rise is due to higher inflation expectations or to changes in the liquidity of those Treasury instruments or inflation risk. Going forward, we will need to monitor inflation expectations carefully to ensure that they do indeed remain well anchored.

All speeches have now stated that there are signs inflation expectations may be elevating.

There are two schools of thought on this at the Fed. The majority will state that when expectations begin to rise, it is too late. The minority say you can let them rise a ‘little bit’, but then they must take decisive action.

Since August, the Fed forecasts have been projecting that economic weakness will bring down prices. With both hawks and doves now acknowledging that this my not be the case, it could be the official Fed forecasts have elevated their near- and medium-term inflation forecasts.

The long-term Fed inflation forecast will remain the same, as it indicates what their long-term inflation target is. But also in the forecasts is what Yellen called the ‘appropriate monetary policy’ to achieve that target.

This could mean the official forecasts now have higher interest rates built into their forecasting model.

And more so now that Congress passed the fiscal package today. Private forecasts are saying it will add maybe 1% of GDP by Q2 and may double that in Q3. At a minimum, this will help support domestic gasoline demand. (And raising the mortgage cap won’t hurt either.)

My twin themes that began in Q2 2006 remain:

  1. Weakening domestic demand due to the government deficit being too small, but supported by strong exports due to non-residents’ reduced desire to accumulate $US financial assets and now some additional support to demand from today’s fiscal package.
  1. Rising prices are due to Saudis/Russians acting as swing producer and setting price at ever higher levels until demand falls below their pain thresholds.

For the last five months, I have been underestimating the Fed’s inflation tolerance. They all firmly believe that price stability is a necessary condition for optimal long-term growth and employment.

And they all do not want a relative-value story to turn into an inflation story as happened in the 1970s.

The Fed is data dependent; the question is which data.

At some point, it becomes the inflation data, and at that point, the Fed is way behind the inflation curve.

For example, rates are up to 7.25% in Australia and their inflation is 1% lower than ours.

Bernanke spends next week. The fixed exchange rate types of deflationary risks he has feared have not materialized.

It is looking more like the 1970s than the 1930s.

If Bernanke confirms inflation expectations have been elevating, the easing cycle may be over.

No matter how weak the economy may get in the near term.